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1 
Non-Standard Work Arrangements and Configurations of Firm and Societal 
Systems  
 
Abstract 
In this study, we proposed and empirically confirmed that the use of non-standard 
working arrangements (NSWAs) varies according to firm system and societal cluster. 
Utilizing the configurational, institutional and cultural perspectives, we explored 
antecedents to the use of four NSWAs across firms in six countries, expanding the scope 
of variables examined in relation to NSWAs and capturing context as a way of 
broadening the theory base on the subject. We found a tendency towards greater use of 
NSWAs among firm systems that foster internal socialization and career advancement 
over time as well as national contexts that promote employment protection and/or 
institutional collectivism. Finally, we found national context to be a significant 
determinant of firm system, reinforcing the importance of aligning national with 
organizational level antecedents to the study of NSWAs. 
 
Keywords: working time arrangements, firm system, configurational approach, societal 
system, comparative HRM 
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Introduction 
As firms have expanded internationally and increased their operations in progressively 
competitive environments, they have turned strategically to non-standard working 
arrangements (NSWAs) that vary in the time and place of work, to enhance their 
responsiveness to changes in both market and workforce demands (Ashford, George and 
Blatt, 2007; Perry-Smith and Blum, 2000).  NSWAs differ from traditional office hours 
usually thought of as a seven to eight hour day, five days per week and instead refer to 
patterns of work including flexitime, part-time work, work from home, compressed 
working hours; teleworking and telecommuting, weekend work, overtime and shift work 
(Ashford et al, 2007; Stavrou, 2005). 
NSWAs have the potential to contribute towards organizational competitiveness 
and employee work-life balance (Alis, Karsten and Leopold, 2006; Conway, 2001).  Even 
though classification of NSWAs is far from being absolute (see Barnett and Hall, 2001; 
Purcell, Hogarth & Simm, 1999; Raabe, 1996; Sheibl and Dex, 1998), two main 
categorizations have emerged throughout the years: arrangements that involve mainly 
employer-focused and those that involve mainly employee-focused NSWAs (Alis, 
Karsten and Leopold, 2006; Stavrou & Kilaniotis, 2009). The former classification 
denotes flexibility enforced to serve mainly organizational needs, such as increased 
operational efficiency and work time (Albion, 2004; Stavrou, 2005); nevertheless, it can 
also become employee-focused when employees prefer it (Brewster et al, 1997; Conway, 
2001).  The latter classification indicates flexibility offered by organizations with an 
emphasis on meeting employees’ multiple needs (Albion, 2004) but it may also be 
beneficial to the organization through, for example, the maintenance of a stable 
workforce (Branine, 2003; Hornung et al., 2008).  Rapoport, Bailyn, Fletcher and Pruitt 
(2002) discuss the dual agenda of the business case for flexibility and the work-life of 
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employees.  According to Beauregard and Henry (2009: 9), organizations are 
increasingly pressured to implement work practices intended to facilitate employees' 
efforts to fulfil both their employment-related and their personal responsibilities. 
The majority of research has tended to focus on the effects of NSWAs on 
financial performance, productivity, product and process innovations (see Beauregard 
and Henry, 2009; Stavrou, 2005) and turnover (see Stavrou and Kilanotis, 2010).  Many 
studies have also focused on the degree of personal discretion and autonomy for 
employees that often accompany certain NSWAs and their effects on work-life balance 
and stress (Barker, 1995; Kelliher & Anderson, 2008; Raghuram & Wiesenfeld, 2004).  
Yet, other studies have found links with work, organization and life satisfaction (Peters, 
den Dulk and van der Lippe, 2009), although unintended consequences, such as work 
intensification, may result from the introduction of NSWAs (see Kelliher and Anderson, 
2010).     
Although many of these studies report positive effects for both the employee and 
the organization (Stavrou, 2005; van der Meer, Ringdal, Boselie, Brewster and Paauwe, 
2009), other studies have challenged the notion that NSWAs are necessarily more 
attractive to employees and employers than standard work arrangements (Rau and 
Hyland, 2002).  Research on these relationships has produced mixed results (Edgar & 
Geare, 2005; Perry-Smith & Blum, 2000).  In a systematic review of the evidence for a 
business case for using flexible working to improve performance, DeMenezes and 
Kelliher (2012) ascribed these mixed findings to a number of factors: first, the variety of 
conceptualizations of NSWAs; second, differences in the measurement of NSWAs; third, 
the failure to consistently consider both formal and informal NSWAs; and finally, the 
length of time working flexibly or the availability of the policy.   
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In this paper, we move beyond these methodological issues to propose that further 
research of how the use of NSWAs varies by both organizational and national context 
could help us understand at least in part these inconsistent findings in extant research (de 
Menezes and Kelliher, 2012; Tregaskis and Brewster, 2006).  The aforementioned 
studies, with their similarities and contradictions, have been conducted within a multitude 
of settings that may affect the utilization rates of NSWAs (Albion, 2004; Aycan, 2005; 
Brewster et al., 2005).  Indeed, a number of authors have pointed out that NSWAs vary in 
use among organizational contexts across the world (Bardoel, 2003; den Dulk, Peters and 
Poutsma, 2012; Kalleberg, 2001; Lewis and den Dulk, 2008; Ollier-Malaterre, Valcour, 
den Dulk and Kossek, 2013).  However, research has not explicitly investigated the 
impact of the context in which NSWAs occur as an antecedent to their use (de Menezes 
and Kelliher, 2012).   Specifically, most studies of antecedents to NSWA use have 
focused at the employee level (see Lambert, Marler and Gueutal, 2008), in single country 
contexts (see Idiagbon-Oke and Oke, 2011 for example) and within specific industries 
(Henly and Lambert, 2010). Studies and reports that have examined NSWAs across 
multiple country settings are few and, while useful,  do not yet cover the issues addressed 
in this manuscript (i.e. Bardoel, 2003; den Dulk et al., 2012; Eurofound, 2010; Kassinis 
and Stavrou, 2013; Ollier-Malaterre, 2009).   
We build on these studies by examining drivers of NSWA use at the organisational 
and country level.  First, we use Delery and Doty´s (1996) configurational approach to 
human resource management (HRM) to propose that firm system – the market-type and 
the internal - is an organizational level antecedent to NSWA utilization. Second, we 
extend the configurational approach to the national level by examining the role of societal 
system as a higher level antecedent to both NSWA use and firm system. For this, we use 
two separate but interrelated theoretical approaches, namely the institutional and the 
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cultural. In our view, societal system configurations involve correlated patterns of shared 
meaning which result from both relevant national level institutional environments 
(Kostova and Roth, 2002; Whitley, 1999) and cultural values (House, Javidan, Hanges 
and Dorfman, 2002).  From the institutional perspective we utilize Legal Theory and 
from the cultural perspective we utilize the Global Leadership and Organizational 
Behavior Effectiveness (GLOBE) approach.  We examine six countries, Australia, 
Denmark, Finland, Sweden, the UK, and the USA which on the basis of Legal Theory 
(Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2004) and GLOBE (House, et 
al., 2002) are grouped into two societal systems, the Anglo and the Nordic.  
We argue that organizations should not seek consistency across contexts in their use 
of NSWAs, but greater horizontal and vertical fit with their organizational and national 
environment respectively.   To our knowledge this is the first study to apply the 
configurational approach to the examination of NSWAs and to explore firm and societal 
system together as antecedents to NSWA use. It is also among few studies to focus on 
antecedents of NSWAs rather than their effects.  
Firm System as Antecedent to NSWAs: Horizontal Fit 
Delery and Doty (1996) highlighted two configurations of employment system, namely 
internal and market firm system, on the basis of seven categories of HRM practices: 
hiring, training, performance measurement, incentive schemes, employment security, 
employee voice, and job descriptions. Even though Delery and Doty’s (1996) use of 
deviation scores to extract the two configurations has been criticised and suggestions 
have been made to improve this methodology, this is still considered among the most 
accepted methods (Fiss, 2007; Martın-Alcazar, Romero-Fernandez and Sanchez-Gardey, 
2005). Nevertheless, it remains true that these management patterns are ideal types 
(Delery and Doty, 1996), and that the extraction of “paradigmatic configurations from the 
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elements that build the human resource system entails a simplification of reality” 
(Martın-Alcazar, Romero-Fernandez and Sanchez-Gardey, 2005:643). 
According to Chow, Huang and Liu, (2008), configurations are an ingrained part of 
firm structures and collectively cover the majority of organizations under consideration. 
Therefore, these employment systems reflect the predominant employment culture of an 
organization. Essentially, the employment mode in internal firm systems is relational and 
process oriented through formal and informal socialization processes over time, while the 
employment mode in market firm systems is short-term, contractual and results oriented.  
Acknowledging possible variations across firm practices and systems, and in order to 
relax the assumption behind this approach that firms have a unitary approach covering all 
employees, the two firm systems are examined as a continuum between opposing sets of 
these practices.  
In internal firm systems, management is more likely to hire internally, engage in 
formal training and extensive socialization, offer minimal incentive schemes, guarantee 
employment, encourage employee voice and have tightly defined jobs. In market oriented 
systems, management is more likely to hire externally, minimize formal training, offer 
incentive schemes extensively, not guarantee employment nor encourage employee 
voice, and have loose job definitions.  We postulate that the use of NSWAs will vary 
according to organizations’ HRM firm system configuration.  
Given their internal focus as described above, management in more internal firm 
systems will seek to address the dual agenda of meeting firm requirements and 
facilitating employee life management needs. Kalleberg (2001) suggests that firms 
focusing on establishing long-term relations with employees are less likely to externalise 
work and more likely to offer extensive training. Further, where employee commitment is 
important, emphasis is often given to job security and voice (Delery and Doty, 1996). We 
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therefore suggest that internally focused firms are better aligned horizontally with the use 
of NSWAs that are seen as satisfying employee as well as employer needs.   
NSWAs quoted in the literature as most likely to be seen as satisfying both 
employer and employee needs and to be associated with better employee life 
management (Perry-Smith and Blum, 2000; Kelliher and Anderson, 2008) are options for 
remote working such as telework and for flexibility at the office such as flexitime. Such 
options are cited to provide employees with choices over where and when they do their 
jobs, thus increasing the perception of individual control (Hall and Atkinson, 2006).  
Similarly, they can have positive outcomes for organizations through office closure for 
instance (saving on building costs).   According to Westman (2010) and Baltes et al. 
(1999), these positive outcomes provide stability within the organization, enhanced by a 
committed workforce; a key benefit of offering flexible working is seen as the retention 
of valued employees (Bailyn et al, 2001) which is crucial in internally oriented 
organizations that hire mainly from within (Delery and Doty, 1996). Thus, we propose 
that telework and flexitime are more common among organizations with internal firm 
systems that want to maintain a stable workforce.   
Nevertheless, we need to keep in mind that telework may not be always entirely 
beneficial to employees as its usage may result in individual difficulties in managing the 
boundaries between the work and non-work domains (Ashford et al., 2007; Kelliher & 
Anderson, 2009; Ransome, 2008). Equally, tensions can arise if employees do not 
welcome such change in their working arrangements (Harris, 2003). Similarly, Kossek, 
Barber and Winters (1993) found that employees were less likely to accept the use of 
NSWAs if they felt that the company was introducing them only for external reasons 
rather than a genuine desire to also benefit employees. This behavior by management 
would be closer to a market firm orientation. 
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Given their market orientation, management in market firm systems may be 
primarily interested in increasing service and work hours than meeting employee needs, 
thus promoting NSWAs primarily for this reason (Bailyn, Rayman, Bengsten, Carre and 
Tierney, 2001). They do not focus on developing their internal workforce or creating 
long-term commitment among employees (Delery and Doty, 1996).  Furthermore, such 
firm systems emphasize efficiency and performance (Ashford et al., 2007), thus are more 
likely to promote results-oriented rather than developmental appraisals.  
Arrangements that facilitate firms to adjust activity to seasonal effects on demand 
and fluctuations in the economy or in the business cycle often involve overtime or fixed 
term contracts (Ashford et al., 2007). Pressured by rapid technological advancements, the 
complexity or seasonality of certain jobs, and the need to reduce staffing costs, employers 
seek temporary personnel who are easily recyclable (Brewster et al., 1997). Many of 
these arrangements have initially surfaced due to increased rates of unemployment or 
competitive forces making the work environment volatile and unstable (Brewster et al., 
1997). Thus, we propose that employees in the market firm system are more likely to use 
overtime and fixed term contracts as market oriented organizations strive to facilitate, 
rather than control, organizational operations in order to coordinate resources. These 
arguments lead to our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1. Telework and flexitime are positively related to more internal 
firm systems while overtime and fixed term contracts are positively related to 
more market firm systems.  
Societal Systems as Antecedents to NSWAs: Vertical Fit 
In line with Meyer et al.’s (1993) suggestion for the use of configurational thinking at 
levels of analysis other than organizational, we propose the use of the configurational 
approach at the societal level.  The configurational approach is intended to promote a 
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better understanding of organizational phenomena by facilitating the grouping of 
organizations into distinct, internally consistent schemas rather than trying to understand 
such phenomena across all types of organizations (Ketchen, Thomas and Snow, 1993; 
Meyer et al., 1993).   
To paraphrase Pries (2005: 186), societal configurations - regarded as a dense 
and durable configuration of social practices, systems of symbols and artifacts - are 
necessary when studying social phenomena.  The challenge is to identify the 
appropriate configurations for the phenomenon at hand. He puts forward two 
conditions for the identification of societal configurations: (1) the cohesion of 
features considered as important within the societal configuration should be 
significantly greater than that of features shared by it and other societal entities; and 
(2) the differences among aspects and variables considered as important within the 
societal configuration should be significantly less than those between it and other 
societal entities.  
We propose that such societal configurations can be identified and affect the use 
of NSWAs in firms. We adopt Fey, Morgulis-Yakushev, Park, and Bjorkman’s (2009) 
argument that both the institutional and cultural approaches are helpful in understanding 
societal differences and similarities in human resource management practices.  Thus 
configurations at the societal level may involve common patterns from both relevant 
institutional environments (Kostova and Roth, 2002; Whitley, 1999) and cultural values 
(House, et al., 2002).   
Institutional Environments 
 According to the institutional approach (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), organizations 
operating in various countries are pressured to conform to dissimilarities idiosyncratic to 
national institutional regimes surrounding them in order to gain and maintain legitimacy 
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in relation to their environment (Fey et al., 2009; Gooderham, Nordhaug and Ringdal, 
1999). Employers will look for best fit, but will tend to adopt local understandings of best 
practice in order to conform to the formal rules and unwritten norms of specific 
institutional contexts (Kostova and Roth, 2002).  
 A large part of the institutional approach involves national laws and regulations. In 
this respect, Legal Theory assumes that countries with different legal traditions use 
different institutional tools for exerting control on businesses, thus forming societal 
systems or configurations within which the patterns of regulation are correlated (Botero, 
et al., 2004). This theory emphasizes the emergence of a number of distinct legal 
traditions or systems in Western Europe and their subsequent dispersion throughout the 
world. These systems are configured into those of: common law, civil law, the German 
code, socialist law and the Nordic legal system.  
Kelly and Kalev (2006) note that different laws at a national level can encourage or 
discourage the diffusion of NSWAs at the organizational level.  In a similar fashion, 
Kalleberg (2001) emphasizes the importance of considering the role of relevant laws and 
regulations covering employment when looking at flexibility across institutional contexts.  
Regulatory measures relevant to NSWAs are employment protection laws (Kassinis and 
Stavrou, 2013). Employment protection laws include provisions related to the flexibility 
of working conditions, alternatives to the standard employment contract, and the 
termination of employment (Botero et al., 2004). Such laws define the status of full-time 
employees, the extent and type of fixed-term contracts, the protection of employees from 
having to work unsocial hours, and the conditions under which employees may be laid 
off, including the existence of collective agreements. 
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Cultural Values 
Kildal and Kuhnle (2005) claim that institutional perspectives, such as laws 
discussed above for example, are embedded into the values, norms and assumptions of 
societal culture. Culture-led explanations of firm behavior are based on the notion that 
national values are deeply embedded in society and shape managerial perceptions of how 
the firm should be organized and managed (Aycan, 2005). As in the case of national 
laws, a number of scholars have endorsed the use of clusters (or configurations) rather 
than individual countries in comparisons of societal culture (Gupta et al. 2002; Hofstede 
2001; Ronen and Shenkar, 1985).  Although the clusters and specific countries within 
them vary in extant research, studies do demonstrate that HRM practices considered 
appropriate in one cultural context may be less appropriate in another (Ferris, Hochwater, 
Buckley, Harrell-Cook and Frink, 1999). Using Gupta et al.’s (2002) configurations from 
the GLOBE research program, one of the latest studies on culture providing a more 
inclusive and recent list of variables to classify countries into clusters (House et al., 
2002); we argue that societal clusters (or configurations) serve as direct determinants of 
NSWA use.  
In this respect, Lyness and Judiesch (2008) report on research in fourteen countries 
based on the GLOBE project which shows that firms and employees in certain cultures 
value flexibility in work hours more than those in others. Similarly, Mutari and Figart 
(2001) form work time regimes according to the degree of flexibility in work hours and 
gender equity in work schedules and economic roles. Further, Peters et al.’s (2009) 
research shows that different cultural values, in subsidiaries of an ICT-multinational in 
France and the Netherlands, were related to differences in telework adoption among line 
managers.  Finally, Rao (2009) explains that flexible work options are more prevalent in 
MNCs whose origin is from certain cultures than others.  
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From the nine GLOBE dimensions we focus on Institutional Collectivism due to its 
connection to NSWAs in extant research. According to House et al. (2002: 30), 
Institutional Collectivism is “the degree to which organizational and societal institutional 
practices encourage and reward collective distribution of resources and collective action.”  
Key characteristics of societies that have high institutional collectivism, such as the 
Nordics, include group loyalty, high interdependence within organizations, a societal 
system that attempts to serve collective rather than individual interests, rewards driven by 
seniority needs and within group equity, and group decision making. Specifically in 
relation to working time flexibility, Hytter (2007) notes that cultures high in institutional 
collectivism pay attention to the welfare of employees and are expected to show more 
pro-social, organizational citizenship behavior, offering harmony between work and life 
balance. Differently, among societies low in institutional collectivism, such as the Anglo 
cluster in GLOBE, the focus is on the individual who is considered independent from the 
organization, rewards are driven by success, and decisions are based on individual or firm 
interests (Gupta et al., 2002).  
Combining Institutional and Cultural Perspectives 
Combining the institutional and cultural perspectives just discussed, we focus on two 
societal configurations with distinct legal systems on employment (Botero et al., 2004) 
and assumptions on institutional collectivism driving practice (Gupta et al., 2002):  those 
of common law which emerged in the United Kingdom (UK) and subsequently diffused 
among the Anglo world (i.e. UK, Ireland, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand); and those of the Nordic system which is indigenous to Sweden, Norway, 
Denmark, and Finland. 1  In this case, institutional and cultural categorizations coincide.  
                                            
1 The Anglo and Nordic as societal systems have many commonalities. They belong to Western Europe, 
are both considered low in power distance and in-group collectivism and score high on performance 
orientation (House et al., 2002). Further, their gender egalitarianism scores are only moderately different. 
However, they differ substantially in institutional collectivism and employment protection. 
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While we cannot ignore country level differences and idiosyncrasies, generally firms 
in countries using common law tend to rely less on regulation and more on markets and 
contracts; they are rated low on institutional collectivism so the driving cultural forces are 
the mimetic pressures of employer choice and the overarching need to compete for a 
more individualist distribution of resources (Botero et al., 2004; House et al., 2002). 
Firms in the Nordic system rely heavily on legislative protection, collective bargaining 
and normative pressures for the common good (Eiken, 2008).  
  Employees in Nordic systems, knowing that their job is protected by legislation 
and collective agreements, are in a better position to negotiate more favorable working 
terms with their employers (Castles, 2003; Schott, 2012). Furthermore, in countries with 
relatively strict employment protection, firms tend to rely more on internal flexibility (i.e. 
via working hours) rather than on layoffs (Eichhorst, Escudero, Marx, & Tobin, 2010).  
Differently, in most Anglo countries, where work-related regulations are fewer and union 
power is weaker, firms have much discretion in promoting the use of working time 
arrangements that fit firm needs without necessarily taking into account employee 
preferences. The US is among the Anglo countries with the least regulated labour market 
in relation to employment protection (Kahn, 2010).   
Thus, we propose that in organizations operating in the Nordic world employees 
would be more likely to use both telework and flexitime. The institutionally collective 
norms and market regulations in Nordic countries in relation to flexibility take into 
account firm flexibility, employee wellbeing and job security (Eiken, 2008; Klammer, 
Muffels and Wilthagen, 2008). According to Brewster, Mayrhofer and Morley, (2004) 
flexibility in the Nordics is emphasized in all work-related aspects, to accommodate for 
the non-work ones (Eiken, 2008). Differently, in organisations of the Anglo cluster, 
where the emphasis may be on firm needs, employees will be more likely to use overtime 
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and fixed term contracts to meet fluctuations in the business cycle.  In such systems, 
legislative restrictions on flexibility are generally few, thus flexibility tends to be firm-
centered (Kalleberg, 2001) and weak in protecting the core workforce (Budd and 
Mumford, 2006).  In turn, we propose:  
Hypothesis 2. Telework and flexitime will be used more in countries of the 
Nordic societal system with stricter Employment Laws and higher 
Institutional Collectivism; overtime and fixed term contracts will be used 
more in countries of the Anglo societal system with less strict Employment 
Laws and lower Institutional Collectivism. 
Societal Systems as Antecedents to Firm System 
According to Gooderham et al. (1999) and House et al. (2002) societies affect 
organizational practices: why then should societal system not affect firm system? In fact, 
given the aforementioned discussions, we see a resemblance between the internal firm 
system and the Nordic societal system as well as between the market firm system and the 
Anglo societal system. More explicitly, as in internal firm systems, organizations in the 
Nordics are distinguished by decentralised decision-making and extensive 
communication practices, high unionization levels and job security (Brewster et al., 2004; 
Hofstede, 2001). Their high institutional collectivism and strong employment protection 
system predisposes organizations in the Nordics to foster the development of their 
internal workforce (Brewster et al., 2004). 
Differently, like in market firm systems, firms in the Anglo configuration are more 
likely to adopt a merit-based approach to people management (Ashkanasy, Trevor-
Roberts and Earnshaw, 2002). They aim to maximise short-term profits for investors 
rather than looking for a broader accord of welfare (Fenton-O´Creevy, Gooderham and 
Nordhaug, 2008). Abrams, Ando and Hinkle (1998) characterised these societies as 
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contractual, where job security is not guaranteed and personal trust is not developed 
through long-term relations. Their markets are quite deregulated and employment 
relations are weak (Budd and Mumford, 2006; Kalleberg, 2001).  In turn, we propose 
that:  
Hypothesis 3. Market firm systems are more likely in Anglo configurations 
and internal firm systems are more likely in the Nordic configurations. 
Methods 
Sample 
We used primary data from the 2009-10 Cranet comparative survey of HRM policies and 
practices (for full details see Brewster et al., 2004; Parry, Stavrou and Morley, 2011). The 
survey is conducted by an international network of researchers, usually from a single 
academic institution representing each country included in the survey.  Since a 
comprehensive international database with all organizations was not available, each 
participating institution was responsible for developing a mailing list of organizational 
contacts in their country.  While in the majority of countries commercial or governmental 
databases were used, in some countries databases from professional associations were 
used.  The survey was sent to all of the organizations on the developed list.  
  The unit of analysis was the organization and the respondent was the highest-ranking 
corporate officer in charge of HRM, as a key informant (Arthur and Boyles, 2007). The 
questions asked were deliberately designed to rely on factual information about HRM 
within the organization. Furthermore, to discourage “guessing,” respondents were 
advised to leave blank any questions for which they did not know the answer.   As per 
Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee and Podsakoff (2003), in order to avoid common method 
variance, respondents were guaranteed anonymity and criterion measures were placed in 
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different sections of the questionnaire and in different formats from predictor and 
demographic variables.  
The questionnaire was developed using an iterative process based on past 
literature on HRM policies and practices and discussions of the Cranet research team. It 
was first developed in English and then translated into the language of each country by a 
local HRM expert.  The questionnaire was then translated back into English by a different 
HRM expert in each country to ensure that the meaning of each question remained the 
same. Any differences found after the back translation were changed after discussion 
between the research team and the partner in each country, in order to ensure that the 
questions in the survey retained their intended meaning (Cascio, 2012). The questionnaire 
was first pilot tested locally in each country (Cushner and Brislin, 1996) and shared with 
local HRM executives to ensure that the meaning was accurate.  
Potential respondents were contacted by letter or email and subsequently sent a 
copy of the questionnaire. To encourage response, non-respondents were later sent a 
reminder. We compared answers from the first 10% of respondents to return the 
questionnaire to those of the last 10% of respondents (who are assumed to be most like 
non-respondents) to the questions used in this study and found no evidence of systematic 
response bias (Cascio, 2012). The response rate for the individual countries in our study 
varied between 16 and 22 percent. Our final sample was 753 businesses.    
Measures 
Legal Framework: We use Botero et al.’s (2004) Employment Laws Index, the values of 
which are normalized and range from 0 to 1, with higher values representing more 
extensive legal protection of employees. The index is calculated as the average of 
alternative employment contracts, cost of increasing hours worked, cost of firing 
employees and extent of dismissal procedures. Alternative employment contracts involve 
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the existence and cost of alternatives to the standard employment contract. The cost of 
increasing hours worked is a measure of how strictly employment laws protect employees 
from being obliged to work more. The cost of increasing hours worked (including 
maximum allowed overtime) is the ratio of the final to the initial wage bill. The cost of 
dismissing employees involves the notice period, severance pay, and any mandatory 
penalties established by law or mandatory collective agreements given the employees’ 
tenure with the firm. Finally, dismissal procedures involve employee protection 
established by law or mandatory collective agreements. 
Culture: We used GLOBE’s measure of Institutional Collectivism. GLOBE used 
primary data from 951 organizations and 17300 middle managers to measure national 
culture across nine dimensions (scale from one to seven) and develop nine cultural 
clusters (Gupta et al., 2002). The higher the value the higher the institutional collectivism 
is in a country.  
Societal System: We created clusters of Anglo and Nordic systems from both Legal 
Theory and GLOBE. To create the clusters, we conducted a two-step cluster analysis of 
each the aforementioned national level variables (Employment Law Index and 
Institutional Collectivism) to group countries in our study into their respective societal 
system. Two categories were confirmed: the Anglo (n=301) societal system included the 
UK (n=87), Australia (n=61) and the USA (n=153); and the Nordic societal system 
(n=452) included Finland (n=44), Sweden (n=158), and Denmark. (n=250). This 
confirmed that using a configurational (cluster) approach was appropriate for this study. 
The resulting clusters for GLOBE and Legal Theory were identical so will be tested 
together in this study. 
NSWAs: From the Cranet dataset we extracted four variables: overtime, fixed-term 
contracts, flexitime and telework. All NSWAs were measured on a scale from 0 = not 
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used, 1 = ≤5% of the workforce, 2 = 6-10% of the workforce, 3 = 11-20% of the 
workforce, 4 = 21-50% of the workforce to 5 = > 50% of the workforce.  
 Firm System: We constructed an index of firm system, based on the definitions of 
Delery and Doty´s (1996) seven sets of HRM practices.  Organizations were given a 
score on this continuous variable representing whether their HRM practices were more 
internal or market oriented. The categories and specific variables addressed are discussed 
next: (a) internal career opportunities - positions are filled primarily internally for each of 
four staff categories of employees (managerial, professional/technical, clerical and 
manual); (b) training and development - different methods for career development are 
used (i.e. cross organizational, formal career paths, development centers development 
schemes, secondments, etc); (c) job descriptions/definitions are tight or broad; (d) 
appraisals - performance appraisals are used primarily for pay determination or for 
analyzing training/development needs; (e) incentives - profit sharing, share schemes, 
stock options or performance related pay offered to employees; (f) participation - 
employees communicate their views directly to senior managers or through immediate 
supervisor, trade unions, works councils, regular workforce meetings, team briefings, 
suggestion  schemes and/or electronic communication; (g) employment security - 
mandatory layoffs and/or termination of contracts are used versus recruitment freeze as a 
downsizing strategy.  
  Originally, we extracted 49 variables from the Cranet survey. Each of these measures 
received a value of zero (0) when relevant to internal systems, and a value of one (1) 
when relevant to market systems.  First, given that each category should not necessarily 
have a higher weight than the other, we created an index of variables for each of the 
seven categories above: to do so, where applicable, we conducted PCA and Cronbach’s 
alpha for the variables of each category to ensure parsimony in the variables chosen; we 
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used the average of those that measured the same construct and added them with the rest.  
Then, we added each category to come up with the Firm System Index – the higher the 
index the more market-driven the firm system (range 1 to 28.25). For uniformity with the 
other variables in the model, this index was standardized to have a mean of zero and a 
standard deviation of 1. 
 To establish the validity of these variables (given that the content validity of these 
items had been already established by Cranet through the design and testing of the 
instrument as described above), we tested for criterion related validity by conducting a 
regression between our index and the annual rate of turnover in these businesses.  We 
tested and confirmed the assumption that market firm systems would experience higher 
turnover.  Furthermore, as per criterion validity, unionization levels were negatively 
related to market firm system at both the binary and multivariate levels: the assumption 
was that market firm systems had lower employee unionization levels. Finally, we re-ran 
the analysis separately with each of the seven HRM categories and NSWAs: the results 
were consistent. 
 Controls: We used a number of contextual variables as controls in order to reduce the 
possibility of spurious results. We chose those controls most frequently cited in the 
relevant literature (see for example, Huselid, Jackson and Schuler, 1997; Wiggins and 
Ruefli, 2002; Kassinis and Stavrou, 2013). Organization size was measured as the log 
number of employees and subsequently standardized; main market was used to explain 
whether the market for the organization was local/national (1) or cross-national (0); and 
industry sector clarified whether the organization was services or manufacturing. 
Results 
First we report the descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations between our variables 
in order to provide an overview of variable and sample characteristics (see Table 1). Two 
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of the four NSWAs, flexitime and telework, were significantly and negatively related to 
firm system. Also, three NSWAs, namely overtime, flexitime and fixed term contracts, 
were significantly and positively related to the employment law index and institutional 
collectivism.  Furthermore, all NSWAs were significantly and negatively related to the 
Anglo societal system. Finally, firm system was significantly related to both the 
employment law index and institutional collectivism in a negative manner and to Anglo 
societal system in a positive manner.  
 As revealed in Table 1, institutional collectivism and employment law were highly 
correlated. After conducting principle components analysis between them resulting in one 
principle component, we realised that they represented one concept (society) and were 
thus interchangeable. In turn, they could not be in the same multilevel analysis. We 
therefore tested for them both separately and as a single variable representing Nordic vs. 
Anglo societies.   
‘Table 1 near here’ 
Given the nature of the dependent variables, we conducted ordinal regressions to 
empirically test hypotheses H1 and H2. We tested for relationships between NSWAs and 
firm system, NSWAs and employment law or institutional collectivism separately as well 
as NSWAs and societal system (Anglo vs. Nordic). Each time the appropriate link 
function was used depending on the distribution of the corresponding dependent variable. 
An alpha of .05, two-tailed, was used for all analyses. The results are summarised in 
Table 2. Specifically, flexitime and telework were more likely in internal firm systems, 
while – with small variations - NSWAs tended to be more likely in Nordic societal 
systems of stricter employment laws and higher institutional collectivism. 
‘Table 2 near here’ 
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Subsequently, to explore differences between each NSWA and each country within 
societal system, we ran ordinal regressions for each NSWA and each country-level 
dummy variable separately (see Table 3). With some exceptions, the general pattern is 
the same as in the previous table. Because the results were too many to include in this 
paper, we summarise them in the table below.  
‘Table 3 near here’ 
We complement these results with a set of three dimensional graphs (see Table 3a). 
From the charts, we see general patterns in combinations more clearly. Specifically, 
overtime were more likely in either system of firms in Denmark and Sweden as well as in 
internal systems of firms in the UK and Australia. Flexitime was more likely in either 
system of firms in Finland and Sweden. Telework was more likely in either system of 
firms in Denmark and internal systems of firms in the USA. And, fixed term contracts 
were more likely in internal systems of firms in Finland and Australia and market firm 
systems in Sweden.  
‘Table 3a near here’ 
Finally, we found that (see Table 4) market firm system was positively related with 
the Anglo societal system, and negatively related with institutional collectivism and the 
employment law index (H3).  
‘Table 4 near here’ 
Discussion 
Our study demonstrates that both firm system (H1) and societal (H2) configurations 
are important antecedents to the use of NSWAs. At the same time, societal system is a 
significant determinant of firm system (H3), exemplifying the importance of aligning 
societal systems and organizational employment systems. The contribution of this study 
lies in the specific interrelationships found among the sets of NSWAs, firm system and 
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societal system. Overall, the analyses showed that NSWAs are more likely in Nordic than 
in Anglo societies while only flexitime and telework were significantly related to firm 
system, specifically internal firm system.  Furthermore, from Table 3a we see that use of 
NSWAs varies by firm system in Nordic societies that provide employee security and 
care, but this security and care transfers to higher use of NSWAs in internal firm systems 
in the case of Anglo societies. 
Taking a closer look at the results in relation to the hypotheses of this study, 
flexitime and telework were consistently related to internal firm system (H1) at the 
organizational level of analysis: since such systems emphasize labour markets internal to 
the business, providing extensive training and socialization to employees and adopting 
employment security and participative decision making (Delery and Doty, 1996), their 
use of NSWAs would reflect such values as well.  Exploring societal effects, these 
arrangements were also significantly more common in societies with stronger 
employment laws and higher institutional collectivism (H2).   
These findings demonstrating that national context matters are consistent with extant 
research (den Dulk, et al, 2013; Lewis and den Dulk, 2008; Kassinis and Stavrou, 2013; 
Ollier-Malaterre et al., 2013). Specifically, Nordic countries exhibit higher levels of work 
flexibility that meet employee needs than the rest of Europe (Eiken, 2008; Klammer et 
al., 2008): possibly because legislation and collective agreements are central to the use of 
flexibility in organizations. They also reinforce Brewster et al.´s (2004) claim that such 
flexibility in the Nordics is a collective norm in all work-related aspects. According to 
Legal Theory (Holger, 1996), the employment relationship in Nordic systems is itself a 
valued asset, thus it is nurtured through relevant employment practices, processes and 
laws. In support of this notion, countries high on institutional collectivism place value on 
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strong interdependencies within organizations and the collective interests of their 
members (House et al., 2002). 
Interestingly, and contrary to H2, overtime and fixed term contracts were not 
related to firm system but were also more likely in countries where employment law was 
stronger and institutional collectivism higher (see Table 2). Looking at individual 
societies in Table 3, the picture for overtime is relatively clear: this NSWA is less likely 
in Anglo societies and more likely in one of the Nordic cultures, Denmark.  But also in 
Table 3a, the strongest relationships are first among Nordic countries and only in internal 
systems among firms in Australia and the UK second. In the case of fixed term contracts, 
variation within societal system is greater in Table 3: this NSWA is more likely in 
Australia, Sweden and Finland and less likely in the USA and Denmark. Looking at 
Table 3a, the picture is more similar to that of overtime.  
In this respect, our results show that arrangements such as overtime and fixed term 
contracts may have high demand in national systems where employee protection and 
institutional collectivism are promoted, regardless of firm system, thus reinforcing the 
general conclusions of Tregaskis and Brewster (2006) and reflecting the overlap of both 
employee and employer driven approaches (Beauregard and Henry 2009).  In turn, it is 
not firm level but a safer societal level work environment that is important in order for 
employees to use these NSWAs more. In such an environment these arrangements may 
be used to expand work time and increase operational efficiency (thus meeting employer 
needs) while at the same time legally protecting employees and nurturing their needs 
(employee driven) such as earning extra income (Albion, 2004).  
Finally, organizations in Anglo countries seem more likely to be driven by the 
external labour market (H3): in these cultural and institutional contexts low institutional 
collectivist values prevail and legislative restrictions are few, weakening both employee 
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voice and job security while promoting hiring outside the organization (Abrams et al, 
1998; Botero et al., 2004, House et al., 2002).  Differently, in Nordic countries (H3) with 
high institutional collectivism and a legal employment system that supports employee 
rights, organizations seem more likely to emphasize the internal labour market (Kilponen, 
Mayes and Vilmunen, 2000). These results are reinforced by what Christiansen, Petersen, 
Edling and Haave, (2005) described as the non-market focus of the Nordics, where 
welfare legislation promotes equality, wellbeing and social rights for all citizens.  
Conclusions and Implications 
In this study, we proposed and empirically confirmed that the use of NSWAs varies 
according to firm system and societal cluster. Utilizing the configurational, institutional 
and cultural perspectives, we have applied a standardized questionnaire exploring four 
NSWAs across firms in six countries, expanding the scope of variables examined in 
relation to NSWAs and capturing context as a way of broadening the theory base on the 
subject, as Ashford et al. (2007) proposed. In our view, this paper moves discussions on 
comparative HRM further by outlining the importance of three specific types of context 
in relation to NSWA use: (a) organizational employment culture through firm system; (b) 
national culture such as institutional collectivism; and (c) institutional national regulatory 
employment system. 
The evidence presented in this study reveals a tendency towards greater use of 
NSWAs among internal firm systems that promote a long term relationship between firm 
and employee, and national contexts that promote employment protection and 
institutional collectivism. Nevertheless, country level variations do exist, and when the 
combination of country and firm system are examined, further variations are revealed. In 
this respect, researchers and management need to consider context at both the 
organizational and societal levels when exploring NSWAs (de Dulk et al, 2012), 
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supporting the need for caution in assuming that certain NSWA practices, if standardized 
across firm systems or geographic territories, would be equally common (as per Ryan and 
Kossek, 2008). At the same time, this study provides some guidance as to which NSWAs 
may be more common in which setting, promoting a better understanding of 
organizational and societal values in relation to NSWAs.  
The results may be particularly important for multinational firms as they evaluate 
their decision to adjust to local practice or to use more “universal” approaches to NSWAs 
(Ryan and Kossek, 2008). According to Schuler and Rogovsky (1998), multinationals 
behave as if employees should forget about their local context and adjust to the culture of 
the parent company.  Given our study’s results, multinationals may need to make 
different kinds of adjustments in relation to the use of NSWAs and/or firm system when 
entering the Nordic versus the Anglo institutional and cultural contexts. Potential 
incompatibilities can cause problems related to the integration of the multinational to the 
local context. For example, multinationals may have a harder time applying overtime or 
fixed term contracts in Anglo societies.  Differently, multinationals operating in Nordic 
societal contexts may not need to worry much about choosing among NSWAs. 
Notwithstanding its usefulness, this research has a number of limitations.  To begin 
with, given the small variance accounted for by the independent variables, the use of 
NSWAs cannot be explained only by these. Further, given the novelty of this analysis, a 
more in-depth investigation of the reasons behind the use of NSWAs and the contexts of 
their application may provide more insight into this area of study. For instance, focus 
groups, interviews or panel studies with multiple respondents from each organization 
may be useful: employee groups and employers may provide their reasons for the use of 
different NSWAs. While these methods are very difficult in multi-country, large scale 
studies, they are not impossible. These methods may also help to address the second 
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limitation of our study: the fact that we are unable to distinguish between employer and 
employee driven NSWAs. It was not possible for us to make this distinction accurately as 
we did not ask respondents about the motivation behind their organisation’s NSWA use. 
In fact our results suggest an overlap or blurring between employer and employee driven 
NSWAs. Future research could include collecting matched data from employees and 
employers in order to establish, before setting hypotheses and exploring antecedents, 
which NSWAs are employer and which employee driven.  
Further to the above, other types of NSWAs or national level measures may be 
added to enrich our understanding of working patterns. In particular, this study has not 
examined only legislation that is specific to the use of NSWAs but has focused instead on 
the broader institutional (legislative) context relevant to NSWAs. Laws specific to 
NSWAs vary across countries and would be difficult to compare consistently; however it 
would be useful if future research focused on the impact of such particular legislation.  In 
addition, more societal clusters could be used: we only looked at two western clusters, 
thus our results may not be generalizable beyond these; other clusters from Europe, Asia 
and the Middle East can shed light on possible differences and similarities among very 
different contexts.  
It is also possible that the relationship between NSWAs and firm system may be 
explained better through different controls and moderators or through a different measure 
of firm system that mitigates the assumption of a unitary approach towards all employees. 
In addition, organizations employing, for instance, a large proportion of women may 
have a higher use of certain NSWAs (see Osterman, 1995). Another explanation may be 
related to the level of skill that employees have. Finally, organizational or employee-level 
performance indicators may help explain further the link as well as the concept of 
equifinality between NSWAs, firm system and societal cluster. 
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In summary, establishing a direct association between NSWAs and firm system is 
complicated; societal context adds to this complexity. Despite its limitations, this study is 
one of the first to use a large sample to substantiate empirically a link between NSWAs, 
firm system and societal cluster, and has important implications for practice, particularly 
in MNCs. Its findings should encourage further investigation of the complex interplay 
among NSWAs, organizational and national context.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations 
 Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Overtime  2.88 1.64 1          
2. Flexitime  2.36 1.93  0.17*** 1         
3. Telework  1.01 1.01  0.06  0.28*** 1        
4. Fixed-Term Contracts  1.08 1.08  0.02  0.09*  0.02 1       
5. Firm System 16.75 4.73  0.01 -0.16*** -0.09* -0.05 1      
6. Employment Laws  0.50 0.20  0.14***  0.40***   0.03  0.28*** -0.12*** 1     
7. Institutional Collectivism 4.65 0.38 0.15*** 0.39*** 0.03 0.24*** -0.11** 0.94*** 1    
8. Services Sector  0.50 0.50 -0.14*** -0.08*  0.07†  0.07  0.10** -0.11** -0.12** 1   
9. Main Markets (Int/l)  0.52 0.50   0.06   0.10**  0.05 -0.04 -0.03  0.04  0.03 -0.40*** 1  
10. Firm Size (log)  2.72 0.59   0.19***   0.04  0.06  0.12** -0.11**  0.02  0.03  0.07†  0.01 1 
11. Anglo System   0.38 0.49 -0.20*** -0.42*** -0.16*** -0.18***  0.08* -0.94*** -0.89***  0.09* -0.07† -0.04 
  Two-tailed  † p < 0.10* p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001
39 
Table 2. Ordinal regression analyses among firm system, societal configuration and controls 
 
Dependent Variables Overtime 
(Sig. 0.00) 
Flexitime 
(Sig. 0.00) 
Telework 
(Sig. 0.00) 
Fixed Term Contracts 
(Sig. 0.00) 
Independent and control variables B SE B SE B SE B SE 
(Constant) -2.41*** 0.20 -1.32*** 0.17  0.09 0.12 -0.29** 0.11 
Firm System  0.14 0.09 -0.23** 0.08 -0.22** 0.07 -0.02 0.06 
Employment Laws  0.19* 0.07  0.65*** 0.08  0.01 0.06  0.44*** 0.06 
Service Sector  -0.52*** 0.16 -0.07 0.14  0.36** 0.13  0.23* 0.11 
Main Markets (International)  0.07 0.16  0.32* 0.14  0.23† 0.13  0.12 0.11 
Size (log)  0.34*** 0.08  0.17* 0.07  0,20*** 0.06  0.15** 0.05 
Cox & Snell 0.06   0.19   0.05   0.12  
(Constant) -2.42*** 0.20 -1.27*** 0.16  0.06 0.12 -0.28** 0.11 
Firm System  0.15† 0.09 -0.24** 0.08 -0.21** 0.07 -0.03 0.06 
Institutional Collectivism  0.19** 0.08  0.59*** 0.08 -0.00 0.06  0.42*** 0.05 
Service Sector  -0.48** 0.16 -0.03 0.14  0.39** 0.13  0.15 0.11 
Main Markets (International)  0.09 0.16  0.30* 0.14  0.25† 0.13  0.07 0.11 
Size (log)  0.35*** 0.08  0.17* 0.07  0.18** 0.06  0.13* 0.05 
Cox & Snell  0.06   0.18   0.05   0.12  
(Constant) -2.03*** 0.22 -0.56*** 0.16  0.33* 0.14 -0.01 0.13 
40 
Firm System  0.15† 0.09 -0.25** 0.08 -0.20** 0.07 -0.06 0.06 
Anglo Societal System -0.06*** 0.15 -1.51*** 0.18 -0.39** 0.13 -0.41*** 0.11 
Service Sector  -0.52*** 0.16 -0.09 0.14  0.39** 0.13  0.19† 0.11 
Main Markets (International)  0.04 0.16  0.33* 0.14  0.22† 0.13  0.12 0.11 
Size (log)  0.35*** 0.08  0.14* 0.07  0.21*** 0.06  0.15** 0.05 
Cox & Snell  0.08   0.21   0.07   0.05  
 † p < 0.10, *  p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 3. Summary of Significant Relationships when controlling for Country 
 
Dependent Variables Overtime 
(Sig. 0.00) 
Flexitime 
(Sig. 0.00) 
Telework 
(Sig. 0.00) 
Fixed Term Contracts 
(Sig. 0.00) 
Independent and control variables Significance Significance Significance Significance 
Firm System No Yes (-)*** Yes (-)*** No 
Country-level Dummies (separate)        
    USA Yes (-)* Yes (-)** No Yes (-)*** 
    UK No Yes (-)** Yes (-)*** No 
    Australia Yes (-)* Yes (-)*** Yes (-)† Yes (+)*** 
    Sweden No Yes (+)*** Yes (-)*** Yes (+)*** 
    Denmark Yes (+)*** Yes (+)** Yes (+)*** Yes (-)*** 
    Finland No Yes (+)* No Yes (+)*** 
Service Sector  Yes (-)*** No Yes(+)* No 
Main Markets (International) No Yes (+)† No No 
Size (log) Yes (+)*** No Yes (+)** Yes (+)* 
 † p < 0.10, *  p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
42 
Table 3a. Cross-tabulations between Dependent and Independent Variables 
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Table 4. Linear regression analyses between firm system and societal System 
Dependent Variable (standardised) 
 
Firm System 
(Sig. 0.000) 
Independent and control variables   Beta SE 
(Constant)  0.02 0.07 
Employment Law Index -0.11** 0.03 
Services Sector  0.19** 0.07 
Main Markets (International)  0.02 0.07 
Firm Size (log) -0.13*** 0.03 
Adjusted R2    0.04  
(Constant)  0.05 0.07 
Institutional Collectivism -0.09** 0.03 
Services Sector  0.18* 0.07 
Main Markets (International)  0.01 0.07 
Firm Size (log) -0.13*** 0.04 
Adjusted R2    0.04  
 (Constant)  0.05 0.07 
Anglo Societal System  0.16* 0.07 
Services Sector  0.20** 0.07 
Main Markets (International)  0.03 0.07 
Firm Size (log) -0.13*** 0.03 
Adjusted R2    0.04  
Two tailed † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < 0.001 
 
